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THE DISCRETION OF A TRIAL JUDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA TO MODIFY A CRIMINAL SENTENCE
AFTER ITS PARTIAL EXECUTION

In Pennsylvania, a criminal trial court may resentence a defendant to an increased punishment even after he has partially executed the initial sentence.' This rule is contrary to the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States.2 This Comment will
compare the Pennsylvania rule with the majority rule and analyze
the theory and development of each. Secondly, it will examine
the continued validity of the Pennsylvania rule in light of its apparent violation of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment,
which was recently held applicable to the states by the Supreme
Court. Finally, an alternative to the present Pennsylvania rule
will be advanced.
I.

THE MAJORITY RULE

It is generally held that a criminal trial court has the discretionary power to modify, revise or vacate a sentence during the
term of court in which the sentence was made.3 This power is
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Gaynor v. Maroney, 199 Pa. Super. 81, 184
A.2d 409 (1962).
2. King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938); State v. Heflen,
19 Ala. App. 227, 96 So. 459 (1923); State v. Bigelow, 76 Ariz. 13, 258 P.2d 409
(1953); Fletcher v. State, 198 Ark. 376, 128 S.W.2d 997 (1939); Ex parte
Pedrini, 33 Cal. 2d 876, 206 P.2d 699 (1949); Righi v. People, 145 Col. 1457,
359 P.2d 656 (1961); Kohlfuss v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 149 Conn.
692, 183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962); Rutland v. State, 14 Ga.
746, 82 S.E. 293 (1914); McFarland v. Hunt, 79 Idaho 262, 313 P.2d 1076
(1957); People v. Lance, 25 Ill. 2d 455, 185 N.E.2d 221 (1962); Fine v. Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 252, 44 N.E.2d 659 (1942); People v. Fox, 312 Mich.
577, 20 N.W.2d 732 (1945); State v. Rigg, 257 Minn. 406, 102 N.W.2d 17 (1960)
State v. Porter, 143 Mont. 528, 391 P.2d 704 (1964); Myers v. Fenton, 121
Neb. 56, 236 N.W. 143 (1931); State v. Verdugo, 79 N.M. 767, 449 P.2d 781
(1969); People ex rel. Sedotto v. Jackson, 283 App. Div. 540, 128 N.Y.S.2d
872, rev'd on other grounds, 307 N.Y. 291, 121 N.E.2d 229 (1954); State v.
McLamb, 203 N.C. 442, 166 S.E. 507 (1932); Ex parte Moore, 71 N.D. 274, 300
N.W. 37 (1941); Campbell v. State, 373 P.2d 844 (Okla. Crim. 1962); Ex parte
Watt, 73 S.D. 436, 44 N.W.2d 119 (1950); Williams v. State, 145 Tex. Crim.
536, 170 S.W.2d 482 (1943); Ex parte Lucas, 26 Wash. 2d 289, 173 P.2d 774
(1946); State v. Tucker, 143 W. Va. 114, 100 S.E.2d 550 (1957); Smith v. State
33 Wis. 2d 695, 148 N.W.2d 695 (1967). See also FED. R. Cams. P. 35; DEL.
SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 35(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.25 (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 62-2239 (1965); LA. CrIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 881 (West 1966); N.J.
Cnmv. PRAc. R. 3: 7-13a.
3. See cases and statutes cited note 2 supra. Notice also that some
of these statutes provide for sentence modification during a specific
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not a new one. It has a long history in both the American and
British court systems.'
The need for stability and fairness in the criminal process is
the reason for limiting the trial court's power of sentence modification to the term of court in which the original sentence was
given. Administrative chaos would result if criminal sentences
could be readily altered at any time.5 Furthermore, a form of judicial despotism might ensue if a prisoner was continuously at the
mercy of the trial court.6 Under such uncertain conditions prisoner
7
rehabilitation would be very difficult.
Most jurisdictions, while recognizing the right of the trial judge
to modify the sentence within the original term of court, place one
restriction on this general power: The trial court may not increase
the original sentence if the execution of that sentence has begun.8
The majority which adheres to this restriction asserts that this
limitation was inherited from the common law. 9 However, the majority does not justify the survival of this limitation solely on the
basis of stare decisis. Rather, two rationales have been suggested
by these courts in support of this rule: the "control rationale" and
the "double jeopardy rationale."'1
A. The "control rationale"
The "control rationale" is the older, and more frequently used
theory." It is primarily based upon the concept that trial courts
are unable to increase the prisoner's sentence after partial execution of that sentence because they lack the necessary jurisdiction.
This theory holds that the trial court's control of the defendant
period of time, rather than during the variable time of the remainder of
the term during which the sentence was imposed. This distinction is unimportant for the purposes of this Comment. Therefore, when the text refers
to sentence modification within the trial court term during which the sentence was imposed, sentence modification within any statutorily defined
time period is also included.
4. Commonwealth v. Weymouth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144 (1861).
5. Commonwealth v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 291, 297 (1868).
6. Id. at 299.
7. Id. at 298.
8. See cases and statutes cited note 2 supra.
9. See, e.g,, Fine v. Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 252, 44 N.E.2d 659
(1942).
10. As with most classifications, it may sometimes be difficult to
categorize a rationale because it has characteristics of both types. However, it is submitted that this distinction can always be made between the
two rationales under discussion.
11. See Annot., 168 A.L.R. 707 (1947).

ends when he begins to serve his sentence. 12 At that time, the defendant enters the control of the executive branch of government."
Courts which adhere to this rationale, however, also insist that
if this doctrine is to be consistently maintained, a trial court is unable to decrease a partially executed sentence within the term of
court during which the sentence was originally imposed. For
example, after previously holding that a trial court could not increase, within term, a partially served sentence,"4 the Supreme
Court of Kansas held that it was bound to hold that a decrease was
also prohibited.II
No distinction was there drawn between a new sentence
which increases and one which diminishes the sentence.
The decision rested upon the broad principle that after the
defendant had entered upon the sentence the court no
longer had jurisdiction to modify the sentence. Not only
is the case controlling here, but we believe it lays down the
only safe and sound rule to follow. If the door is opened in
any case and in any degree to modification after the execution has begun, when may the right to open the door be denied and how wide may the door be opened? ...

We can

see only uncertainty, confusion, and the possibility of grave
abuses
in recognizing any such power after sentence has be16
gun.

An additional "control rationale" argument offered to defend
the prohibition of sentence decreases involves the theoretical separation of powers in our governmental systems. Several cases hold
that the decrease of a partially executed sentence is judicial interference with, and infringement upon, the executive powers of commutation and parole."
While the "control rationale" is a popular theory, it is nevertheless, subject to criticism. First, to assume that the commencement
of a prisoner's sentence automatically and irrevocably places him in
the exclusive jurisdiction of the executive branch of government
begs the question.' 8 The "control rationale" concludes that a trial
court's jurisdiction ends when the prisoner begins to serve his
prison sentence only by assuming that partial service of the sentence places the defendant exclusively in the hands of the executive
branch of government. It does not necessarily follow that such is
12. State v. Carte, 157 Kan. 139, 138 P.2d 429 (1943).
13. The exact time of the commencement of the service of the sentence
is often an important technical question. See Shifflet v. Hiatt, 50 F. Supp.
415 (M.D. Pa. 1943); Bradford v. People, 22 Col. 157, 43 P. 1013 (1896).
14. Parks v. Amrine, 154 Kan. 168, 117 P.2d 586 (1941).
15. State v. Carte, 157 Kan. 139, 138 P.2d 429 (1943).
16. Id. at 143, 138 P.2d at 432.
17. People v. Fox, 312 Mich. 577, 20 N.W.2d 732 (1945); State v. Lewis,
226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E.2d 691 (1946).
18. Note, The Judicial Finality of a Criminal Sentence, 44 HAZv. L.
REv. 967, 969 (1934).
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the case. 19 No compelling reason is offered why a particular jurisdiction may not hold that a trial court's power survives the passage
20
of the criminal into the penal system.
Secondly, the "control rationale" argument that judicial sentence reduction after the commencement of service of sentence is a
pre-emption of, and interference with, executive powers is not necessarily correct. Admittedly, from the prisoner's perspective, there
is no practical distinction between an executive pardon and -a judicial sentence reduction. 21 However, the two powers have been
distinguished. In discarding the "control rationale," which its earlier decisions had implicitly endorsed, 22 the United States Supreme
Court held:
To render judgment is a judicial function. To carry the
judgment into effect is an executive function. To cut short
a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment, but does not alter it qua judgment. To reduce a sentence by amendment alters the terms of the judgment itself
and is a judicial act as much
as the imposition of the sen23
tence in the first instance.
The executive pardon or parole is dependent upon the existence of
a valid judgment, and the parole or pardon, in turn, reduces the
judgment's effect. On the other hand, judicial modification changes
24
the nature of the valid judgment itself.
Thirdly, even if judicial sentence modification after partial sentence25execution is a type of pardon, this is not in itself a fatal objection. There are situations in which a governmental agency in one
of the three branches of government might behave in a manner similar to an agency in another branch. Administrative agencies sometimes operate according to a judicial procedure and hand down decisions which are of a judicial nature. 26 Similarly, courts on occasion
19. District Attorney for N. Dist. v. Superior Ct., 342 Mass. 119, 172
N.E.2d 245 (1961).
20. This is precisely what Pennsylvania has done. See note 58 infra

and accompanying text.
21.

Note, The Judicial Finality of a Criminal Sentence, 44 HARv. L.

REv. 967, 969 (1934).

22. See United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1927).
23. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 311 (1931).
24. Note, The JudicialFinality of a Criminal Sentence, 44 HAiv. L. REV.
967, 969 (1934).
25. Id.
26. For example, many of the duties of the Workmen's Compensation
Board are performed in a judicial manner. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§§ 113, 131, 132 (1919).

have assumed a quasi-executive role and have performed adminis27
trative duties.
In light of the above criticism it is submitted that the "control
rationale," which prohibits judicial sentence modification after the
prisoner has begun to serve his sentence, contains some conceptual
weaknesses. The primary justification for the theory, lack of jurisdiction in the judiciary once the sentence has begun, merely assumesits own conclusion. Although the distinction between an executive
pardon and a judicial sentence reduction appears to be semantic
rather than substantive, such a distinction is unnecessary since
executive and judicial actions can overlap and interrelate.
B.

The "double jeopardy rationale"

The fundamental contention of the "double jeopardy rationale"
is that to increase a sentence after its partial execution is to place
the defendant in double jeopardy. 28 Before proceeding with an
elaboration of this rationale, it9 is necessary to examine briefly the
doctrine of double jeopardy.S
Protection against double jeopardy is found in the United States
Constitution, 30 in most state constitutions,3 ' and in case law. 32 Ap-

plication of the doctrine of double jeopardy varies in the different
jurisdictions. It has been uniformly held that the doctrine prevents
one from being tried or prosecuted for the same offense following
an acquittal3 3 or a conviction. 34 However, courts are split on the
question of whether or not the double jeopardy clause includes protection from the peril of a second punishment.35 Courts following
the "double jeopardy rationale" include the prohibition against double punishment within the protection from double jeopardy. 6
27. For example, in enforcing school desegregation, courts have sometimes acted in a quasi-executive fashion. See Taylor v. Board of Educ.,
195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), affd,294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961).
28. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
29. For excellent discussions of this highly complex doctrine see Note,
Double Jeopardy: Its History, Rationale and Future, 70 Dicm. L. REv. 377
(1965); Note, Some Aspects of the Double Jeopardy Problem in Pennsylvania, 19 PITT L. Ray. 630 (1958); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J.
262 (1965).
30.

The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part,

"...

nor shall

any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb; ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (1965); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11
(1947); PA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
32. People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Kings
County Ct. 1952).
33. State v. War, 38 N.J. Super. 201, 118 A.2d 553 (Passaic County
Ct. 1955).
34. Johnson v. State, 191 Md. 447, 62 A.2d 249, (1948).
35. Compare Ex parte Lange, 89 U.S. (18 Wall.) 872 (1873) and Viel v.
Potter, 20 Conn. Supp. 174, 129 A.2d 230 (C.P. 1957), with State v. Carte,
157 Kan. 139, 138 P.2d 429 (1943) and State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62
N.W.2d 512 (1954).
36. See cases cited notes 41 to 44 infra.
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Thus, if protection from double jeopardy includes the prohibition
against double punishment; and if resentencing to an increased sentence after partial execution of the original sentence constitutes a
double punishment; then the increased resentencing violates the
protection from double jeopardy. s7
The federal courts have been the main proponents of the "double jeopardy rationale. '38 This rationale began developing almost
a century ago in the landmark case of Ex parte Lange.3 9 The
United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment 40 prohibited double punishment for one
criminal offense. 41 In dictum almost sixty years later, the Supreme
Court said that the increase of a partially served sentence was double punishment, and was consequently violative of the double jeop44
4
ardy protection.

2

43
and some state courts,
Later federal cases,

have legitimized this dictum.
One of the features that distinguishes the "double jeopardy rationale" from the "control rationale" is that the former does not pre45
vent the trial court from reducing a partially executed sentence.
Courts which adhere to the "double jeopardy rationale" maintain
that the control of the trial court remains vital and effective
throughout the original term of court which imposed the sentence. 46 Therefore, the court during the trial term has the jurisdiction to modify a partially served sentence. It cannot, however, increase a partially executed sentence since this would place the defendant in a second jeopardy.4 7 There is no constitutional or other
bar to sentence reduction. Therefore, with the "double jeopardy
rationale," a trial court may reduce a partially executed sentence
4
within the term of court during which it was initially imposed.
The "double jeopardy rationale," however, also has some conceptual difficulties. The first problem is that the proof of the dou37. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 89 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 872 (1873).
38. See cases cited notes 41 to 43 infra.
39. 89 U.S. (18 Wall.) 872 (1873).
40. See note 30 supra.
41. 89 U.S. (18 Wall.) 872, 882 (1873).
42. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
43. Schultz v. United States, 384 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1967); United States
v. Sacco, 367 F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1966).
44. Viel v. Potter, 20 Conn. Supp. 174, 129 A.2d 230 (C.P. 1957); State
ex rel. Williams v. Riffe, 127 W. Va. 573, 34 S.E.2d 21 (1945).
45. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

ble jeopardy assumes the very question in dispute. The question
of the existence of a second jeopardy is dependent upon the time of
the expiration of the initial jeopardy. 49 As long as the power to
modify the sentence exists, it follows that the first jeopardy has not
expired.50 The second jeopardy depends, therefore, upon the termination of the modification power. However, no compelling reason
is given to justify the cessation of the alteration power, in sentence
increases, when the prisoner begins to serve his sentence. The allegation that a second jeopardy attaches upon partial execution is an
unacceptable justification since it is the very question of double
jeopardy that is in dispute.51
Aside from the validity of the proof of the second jeopardy, conceptual problems are created by the incompatibility of permitting
sentence reductions while denying sentence increases. By permitting sentence reductions, the "double jeopardy rationale" recognizes
that the power to modify the sentence remains viable during the
trial term. 52 The initial jeopardy, therefore, expires only at the
term's end. Thus, any sentence increase during the term of court
in which the initial sentence was imposed could not place the defendant in a second jeopardy.
A similar problem arises if one starts with the presumption that a sentence increase following partial execution places the
defendant in a second jeopardy. If this is the case, then the initial
jeopardy must expire when the prisoner begins to serve his sentence. Thus, if the initial jeopardy has expired, a subsequent sentence reduction is also a second jeopardy.53 Granted, the prisoner's
suffering is lessened. However, the shorter sentence he receives is
54
a second punishment for his crime nonetheless.
It is submitted that these objections to the theory of the "double jeopardy rationale" are valid. Therefore, the "double jeopardy
rationale," like the "control rationale,"55 rests upon questionable
reasoning.
II. THE

PENNSYLVANIA RULE

In Pennsylvania a trial court may, at its discretion, modify a
49. Note, The Judicial Finality of a Criminal Sentence, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 967, 970 (1934).

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
53. Note, The Judicial Finality of a Criminal Sentence, 44 HAZv. L.
REv. 967 (1934).
54. A suggested answer to this dilemma is that the defendant waives
his double jeopardy protection in order to allow his sentence reduction.
Id. However, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
law will not presume a waiver of constitutional rights. Brookhart v. Jarus,
384 U.S. 1 (1966). But, if the defendant does waive his right, could he not
then be resentenced to an increased sentence?
55. See discussion at Section IA of this Comment supra.
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criminal sentence before the expiration of the term in which it was
imposed.56 A 1959 statute provides for the extension of this modification period to thirty days if the court term ends less than thirty
days from the date of sentencing. 57 Therefore, the trial court may
not modify a criminal sentence after either the expiration of the
term during which the sentence was given or thirty days from the
date of sentencing, whichever is longer.5 8 In addition, the trial
court may not modify the original criminal sentence after it has
been fully executed, even if such an attempt is made within the
terms during which the sentence was imposed.5 9 When the modification can be validly made, it may be in the form of a sentence reduction or of an increased penalty. 60
Pennsylvania follows this rule without regard to the limitation
advocated by the majority of courts in this country: that a trial
court may not exercise its discretion to increase the original sentence if the execution of that sentence has begun, even if such an
attempt is made within the term of court of the initial sentencing. 1
In Pennsylvania, a convicted defendant may be resentenced, within
the proper time period,6 2 to an increased punishment even if the
initial sentence has been partially executed. 63 The case law in
Pennsylvania reflects frequent use of the trial court's power to in64
crease a partially served sentence.
An attempt to determine the rationale of the Pennsylvania
rule is a frustrating experience. A survey of Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cases reveals that never has that court directly discussed the
issue of increasing a sentence after partial execution. Although it
has often upheld the discretionary power of a judge to increase a
sentence within the trial term,6" these cases have concentrated on
56.
(1951).
57.
58.
59.
60.
(1953).

Commonwealth ex tel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211, 82 A.2d 244
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1032 (1959).
Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1957).
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R.R., 41 Pa. Super. 29 (1909).
Commonwealth v. Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94 A.2d 582

61. See cases cited note 2 supra.
62. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
63. Commonwealth ex tel. Gaynor v. Maroney, 199 Pa. Super. 81, 184
A.2d 409 (1962).
64. Id.; Commonwealth ex tel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176,
138 A.2d 246 (1958); Commonwealth ex tel. Young v. Day, 180 Pa. Super.
276, 119 A.2d 559 (1956); Commonwealth ex Tel. Lewis v. Tees, 177 Pa.
Super. 132, 110 A.2d 901 (1955); Commonwealth ex tel. Berry v. Tees, 177
Pa. Super. 126, 110 A.2d 794 (1955); Commonwealth ex tel. Laughman v.
Burke, 171 Pa. Super. 343, 90 A.2d 622 (1952).
65. See Commonwealth ex Tel. Holly v. Ashe, 368 Pa. 211, 82 A.2d 301

the question of the expiration of the modification power concurrent
with the expiration of the trial term.66 The relevance of partial
sentence execution, with regard to the right of the trial judge to resentence, has never been discussed by the Supreme Court. Only
once has the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly stated that a
judge could increase a partially executed sentence.6 7 But in that
case, the court emphasized that its decision was not based on that
specific power.6 8
However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, on numerous occasions, has explicitly dealt with the trial court's power to modify
a sentence after partial sentence execution. 69 Yet, in spite of these
decisions, it has never provided a rationale to justify the current
practice of permitting a trial court to increase a partially executed
sentence. A review of the Superior Court cases reveals that the
rule is repeated mechanically, justified solely on the basis of stare
decisis. The rule is so widely accepted that occasionally authority
for it is not even cited, 70 and when it is, the authority is often an
improper one. 7'
In Commonwealth ex rel. Gaynor v. Maroney,72 the petitioner
was resentenced to increased punishments on two larceny indictments. The resentencing occurred during the same term of court as
the original sentencing, but after the defendant had begun serving
the first punishment. The court held:
[T] he time of commitment or fact that part of the original
sentence has been served is immaterial. The general rule is
that the power of the court to alter its sentences continues
throughout
the term so long as they have not been fully
78
executed.
As authority for this holding, the court cited7 4 Commonwealth
ex rel. Berry v. Tees. 76 Berry, however, did not provide any substantive justification for the rule. It noted only that the rule had
never seriously been challenged. Berry, in turn, cited two authorities for its statement of the rule,76 Commonwealth ex rel. Laugh(1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Billman v. Burke, 362 Pa. 319, 66 A.2d 251
(1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Michelotti v. Ashe, 359 Pa. 542, 59 A.2d 891
(1948) ; In re Moskowitz, 329 Pa. 183, 196 A. 498 (1938).
66. See cases cited note 65 infra.
67. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967).
68. Id. at 201, n.7, 231 A.2d at 306, n.7.
69. See cases cited note 64 supra.
70. See Commonwealth ex rel. Schuch v. Burke, 174 Pa. Super. 137,
100 A.2d 122 (1953).
71. See Commonwealth v. Peterson, 172 Pa. Super. 341, 94 A.2d 582
(1953); Commonwealth ex rel. Laughman v. Burke, 171 Pa. Super. 343, 90
A.2d 622 (1952).
72. 199 Pa. Super. 81, 184 A.2d 409 (1962).
73. Id. at 83, 184 A.2d at 410.
74. Id. at 84, 184 A.2d at 410.
75. 177 Pa. Super. 126, 110 A.2d 794 (1955).
76. Id. at 129, 110 A.2d at 795.
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78
man v. Burke7 7 and Commonwealth v. Peterson.
Commonwealth ex rel. Laughman v. Burke cited for support7 9
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case of Commonwealth ex rel.
Holly v. Ashe.80 However, Holly does not explicitly hold that a
sentence may be increased once the prisoner has begun to serve the
sentence. What it does hold is that a judge may, during the trial
term, change or modify a criminal sentence.8 ' Upon referral to the
opinions8 2 cited by the Holly court to justify this holding,83 it is
found that those supporting cases hold only that the modification
power may not be exercised after the expiration of the trial term.
Commonwealth v. Peterson cites 4 Holly, Commonwealth ex
rel. Michelotti v. Ashe,8 5 and also In re Moskowitz."" However,
these latter two cases also hold only that the modification power of
the trial judge may not be exercised after the term in which the
initial sentence Was imposed.8 7
Thus the holding of Gaynor is supported by a series of cases
based only on the proposition that a trial judge cannot exercise his
sentencing discretion after the expiration of the trial term. Unfortunately, Gaynor is not the sole example of this mechanical, illogical approach. 88
One possible explanation for this mechanical justification of
the rule is that a viable rationale exists in the earlier Pennsylvania
common law cases which has since been forgotten. However, an
examination of the older cases does not reveal any such rationale for
the rule. It is not even clear exactly how, or why, the rule developed.

77. 171 Pa. Super. 343, 90 A.2d 622 (1952).
78. 172 Pa. Super. 341, 84 A.2d 582 (1953).
79. 171 Pa. Super. 343, 345, 90 A.2d 622, 623 (1952).
80. 368 Pa. 211, 82 A.2d 244 (1951).
81. Id. at 218, 82 A.2d at 247.
82. Commonwealth ex rel. Billman v. Burke, 362 Pa. 319, 66 A.2d 251
(1949); Commonwealth ex rel. Michelotti v. Ashe, 359 Pa. 592, 59 A.2d 891
(1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Nagle v. Smith, 154 Pa. Super. 392, 36 A.2d
175 (1944); Commonwealth v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 291 (1868).
83. 368 Pa. 211, 215, 82 A.2d 244, 246 (1951).
84. 172 Pa. Super. 341, 343, 94 A.2d 582, 582 (1953).
85. 162 Pa. Super. 18, 56 A.2d 313 (1948).
86. 329 Pa. 183, 196 A. 498 (1938).
87. In re Moskowitz, 329 Pa. 183, 190, 196 A. 498, 502 (1938); Commonwealth ex rel. Michelotti v. Ashe, 162 Pa. Super. 18, 20, 56 A.2d 313, 315
(1948).
88. Two other examples of this negligence in providing proper authority for the rule are: Commonwealth ex rel. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa.
Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246 (1958) (in which the court cited Commonwealth
ex rel. Wallace v. Burke, 158 Pa. Super. 612, 45 A.2d 871 (1946), which
allowed a decrease of sentence within term); Commonwealth ex rel. Schuch

Commonwealth v. Mayloy8 9 was the first Pennsylvania case to
consider, in depth, the question of the trial court's discretion to resentence a criminal defendant. In Mayloy the trial court resentenced the defendant to a reduced punishment. However, this power
of the court was invoked after the term of court in which the original sentence was imposed had expired. 0
Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was concerned almost exclusively with the
justification in terminating the trial court's discretion to modify a
sentence at the end of the trial term.
Mayloy does not explicitly refer to any common law limitation
on the trial court's capacity to increase an already partially served
sentence. Corresponding cases in other jurisdictions provide evidence that such a limitation did exist at common law in England
and in the United Statesf1 However, Mayloy contains some language from which it may be inferred that such an exception was
recognized by the court at that time: "2
[I]f a sentence may be reconsidered during its execution,
why may it not be increased as well as diminished, if the
maximum had not been reached in the first instance? If
reconsidered, it is to be pronounced de novo; and it is within
the same power, exactly, to increase or decrease it. 93
The opinion of Mayloy may reflect either of two theories regarding the court's intention. The court may have misinterpreted,
or at least incompletely interpreted, its common law heritage by
construing past law as permitting a judge to increase a criminal sentence notwithstanding its partial execution. Therefore, its holding
that a trial judge could not modify a sentence after the term of sentence imposition 94 was intended to permit any sentence modification within the term of initial sentence imposition. Or, perhaps the
Mayloy court was aware of the limitation on the power of the trial
judge to increase a sentence after partial execution. However, resolution of the specific issues in Mayloy did not require mention of
this limitation. 92 Consequently, the court either did not state the
limitation or, at best, glossed over the limitation with a subtle reference. If this latter interpretation is correct, the court certainly

v. Burke, 174 Pa. Super. 137, 100 A.2d 122 (1953) (which does not provide
any authority for its statement of the rule).
89. 57 Pa. 291 (1868).
90. Id. at 295.
91. Brown v. Rice, 157 Me. 55 (1890); Commonwealth v. Weymouth,
84 Mass. (2 Allen) 144 (1861).
92. 57 Pa. 291 (1868).
93. Id. at 299. In this supporting argument against the reduction of
the sentence after the trial term's expiration, the court seems to be contending that if a decrease during execution is permissible, then an increase
would have to be allowed also. The implication is that the latter is undesirable.
94. 57 Pa. 291, 301 (1868).
95. Id. at 295.
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did not intend to hold that a trial court could increase a sentence
once a defendant had begun its execution.
Whichever of these two intentions 6 the Mayloy court actually
had, later Pennsylvania courts construed Mayloy as being the complete statement of the law on resentencing by a trial judge. By
the turn of the century, the fact that a sentence was partially executed did not bar the exercise of the trial court's discretion to increase it.9 7 Nowhere is a substantive rationale defending this practice to be found.
It is submitted that neither the old nor the new case law provides a formal, substantive rationale for the Pennsylvania rule.
Instead, two practical reasons may have once made this traditional
practice important.
First, the wide discretion 'given a trial court to modify a sentence may have been warranted at a time when the trial judge had
limited capacity to grant new trials.98 Without this recourse, the
discretion to modify could have been employed to prevent gross injustices., Today, however, the trial judge can grant a new trial.99
Second, the traditional practice may have been warranted when,
due to the technological limitations of the age, facts pertinent to the
determination of sentence reached the judge after the trial. However, modern technology is such that relevant information is readily
available to the trial judge prior to sentencing. The pre-sentence
report'0 0 insures that the full record of the prisoner will be known
to the judge at the time of sentencing. With the availability of the
pre-sentence report, it is submitted that unjust sentences will most
often be the result of the court's carelessness. Therefore, modern
adherence to the Pennsylvania rule would seem 1to condone such
10
negligence at the expense of the prisoner's rights.
96. There is also the possibility that the Mayloy court disagreed with
the common law and felt it better to initiate a new rule. However, there
is no evidence in the case to support that theory.
97. See Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R.R., 41 Pa. Super. 29 (1909).
98. People ex rel. Forsythe v. Court of Sess. of Monroe Cty., 141
N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (Ct. App. 1894).
99. See Commonwealth v. Hartman, 383 Pa, 461, 119 A.2d 211 (1956).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 890 (1965).
101. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 217 Pa. Super. 59, 63, 266 A.2d 799,
800 (1970) (dissenting opinion). For an example of the power of a trial
judge, see Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Tees, 177 Pa. Super. 132, 110
A.2d 901 (1955), where the convicted defendant's sentence was increased
from twenty-three months to life imprisonment. For an example of abuse
of this discretion, see Commonwealth ex rel. Eichelberger v. Maroney, 177
Pa. Super. 323, 110 A.2d 734 (1955), where the defendant's sentence was increased because he had "vilified" the trial judge following the pronouncement of the first sentence.

It is submitted that Pennsylvania's current adherence to the
rule is justified solely on the basis of stare decisis.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE

The Pennsylvania rule has recently come under attack. 0 2 One
critic contends that the rule violates the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment and is therefore unconstitutional. 103
Prior to 1969 the Pennsylvania courts were not compelled to
deal with any federal questions of double jeopardy. The United
States Supreme Court had restricted the application of the constitutional double jeopardy guarantee to federal tribunals.'" Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held that it did not consider Pennsylvania courts bound by the federal prohibition.' °"
However, in recent years mention of the federal double jeopardy
argument was made by some Pennsylvania courts. 10 6 And on one
occasion the Pennsylvania Superior Court implied that if the United
States Supreme Court should apply the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment to the States, it would have to reconsider the
107
Pennsylvania rule.

In 1969, the United States Supreme Court held, in the landmark
case of Benton v. Maryland,08 that the fifth amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. 1 9 The federal courts have long held that an increase
of a sentence after its partial execution violates the double jeopardy clause contained in the fifth amendment." 0 Thus, it would
seem to follow that Pennsylvania's practice of permitting such revision is unconstitutional."'
The only possible basis on which the Pennsylvania rule may be
maintained is that the federal prohibition, extended to the states,
does not entail the prevention of a sentence increase following partial execution.
102. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 217 Pa. Super. 68, 266 A.2d 794
(1970) (dissenting opinion).
103. Id. at 74, 266 A.2d at 797.
104. Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1909).
105. Garland v. Ashe, 344 Pa. 407, 20 A.2d 190 (1942).
106. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 208 Pa. Super. 330, 222 A.2d 739 (1966),
aff'd on other grounds, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967); Commonwealth ex
rel. Berry v. Tees, 177 Pa. Super. 126, 110 A.2d 794 (1955). See also Commonwealth v. Downey, 59 Schuylkill Legal Record 152 (1963). In Downey
the judge, citing federal cases for support, disallowed an increase in sentence even though the increase was made during the trial term of the initial
sentence imposition. Curiously, the case was never appealed.
107. Commonwealth v. Vivian, 208 Pa. Super. 330, 222 A.2d 739 (1966),
aff'd on other grounds, 426 Pa. 192, 231 A.2d 301 (1967).
108. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
109. Id. at 787.
110. See United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931). For text of this
clause see note 30 supra.
111. Commonwealth v. Silverman, 217 Pa. Super. 68, 74, 266 A.2d 794,
797 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
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In its holding, Benton uses language which is capable of a very
liberal interpretation:
On the merits, we hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the State through the
Fourteenth Amendment .... 112
[We today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment represents a fundamental ideal in our
constitutional heritage, and that it should
11 apply to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. s
However, when discussing the nature and background of this
guarantee, the Court mentions only retrial after a prior acquittal.14
Benton involved the conviction of the defendant on a larceny charge
after he had previously been acquitted on the same charge. 115 Furthermore, the case which Benton overruled" 6 was one dealing with
the retrial of a defendant for a crime for which the defendant had
previously been convicted. The Supreme Court of the United States
has consistently limited the formulation of rules of constitutional
law to the fact situation to which it is applied. 117 Therefore, a strict
construction of Benton creates doubt that the decision prohibits
practice of the Pennsylvania rule.
Because Benton is a recent case, the exact nature of the double
jeopardy guarantee extended by this case has yet to be completely
defined." 8 Most of the cases interpreting Benton have dealt with
the question of the retroactivity of the holding" 9 and with the concurrent sentence doctrine. 20 The Supreme Court has implied that
Benton should be liberally construed.' 2' However, it has also been
suggested that a strict construction of Benton indicates that an increase in sentence following the commencement of its execution
122
need not violate the Benton holding.
112. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
113. Id. at 794.
114. Id. at 795.
115. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the defendant was
tried on the charge of burglary and larceny. He was found innocent of the
charge of larceny but was found guilty on the burglary charge. He appealed and his case was remanded as a result of a procedural irregularity.
His conviction was set aside. On retrial the defendant was found guilty of
both larceny and burglary.
116. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
117. See Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
118. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
119. See, e.g., Booker v. Phillips, 418 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1969).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 420 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1970).
121. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 391 n.2 (1970).
122. See United States ex rel. Muro v. La Vallee, 304 F. Supp. 859,
860 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

North Carolina v. Pearce,12 3 decided on the same day as
Benton, adds information pertinent to the nature of the federal protection applied to the states. In Pearce, the Supreme Court held
that, in the imposition of a sentence after a valid retrial, credit must
be given for punishment suffered by the prisoner under the invalid
initial sentence.1 2 The Court held that this decision was required
by the constitutional prohibition of multiple punishments for the
same crime which now applied to the states. 1 25 Cited as authority
by the Court for the inclusion of the multiple punishment protection within the federal double jeopardy prohibition were cases
which hold that it is unconstitutional for a trial judge to increase a
12
partially served sentence.
In a concurring and dissenting opinion to Pearce, Justice Harlan states that "it has long been established that once a prisoner
commences service of a sentence, the Clause prevents a court from
vacating the sentence and then imposing a greater one.' 1 27 And, in
a concurring opinion to the same case, 128 Justice Douglas accepted
without question the concept that an increased penalty following
partial sentence execution was violative29of the prisoner's guarantee
against twice being placed in jeopardy.
Pearce may be considered in either of two ways. First, because
it was decided on the same day as Benton, it provides evidence that
the Supreme Court, in Benton, did prohibit a court from increasing
the penalty of a partially executed sentence. Immediately following Benton, Pearce's inclusion of the multiple punishment prohibition in its description of the federal protection against double jeopardy strongly indicates that Benton intended the same inclusion.
However, even if it is maintained that this is insufficient evidence
of the Benton intention, surely Pearce by itself holds that the federal guarantee against double jeopardy, as applied to the states, includes the prohibition of an increase in sentence following partial
sentence execution. Either interpretation indicates the unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania rule.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that Pennsylvania must modify the resentencing
power of its trial judges in an effort to meet the current constitutional objection.'3 0 It has been submitted that there is no valid
123. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 718.
126. Id. at 717 nall.
127. Id. at 747 (referring to the double jeopardy clause contained in
the fifth amendment).
128. Id. at 726.
129. Id. at 730.
130. There are three ways in which the Pennsylvania rule can be modified. The legislature can pass an appropriate statute prohibiting a trial
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rationale which justifies the continuance of the Pennsylvania
rule. 31 Thus, little will be lost by the elimination of the trial
judge's discretion to increase a partially executed sentence.
The question arises concerning what policy Pennsylvania ought
to adopt. The unconstitutionality of the Pennsylvania rule does not
mean that the "double jeopardy rationale" must be adopted.
Clearly, the "control rationale" is not affected by the extension of
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the states.
This double jeopardy extension sets a minimum standard concerning the limitation of a trial judge's discretion. It prohibits the trial
judge from increasing a partially executed sentence. 13 2 The "control rationale" does even more than the minimum standard requires.
It not only prohibits a sentence increase following partial execution,
133
it forbids a sentence reduction as well.
As previously discussed, both the "control rationale" and the
"double jeopardy rationale" have conceptual shortcomings.'3 4 Due
to the inherent inconsistencies of the two rationales, it is submitted
that on a theoretical basis neither is more attractive than the other.
Therefore, the choice between the two rationales should be made
on the basis of their practical effect. There is one great difference
in the effect of these two rationales: The power of a trial judge to
reduce a partially executed sentence is sanctioned by the "double
jeopardy rationale,' 13 but not by the "control rationale."' 36
It is submitted that the determination of the relative merits of
sentence reduction by the trial judge can be influenced by an emotion. A positive moral feeling is often evoked by a sentence reduction. When a judge recalls a prisoner for sentence reduction, he
implicitly admits that the initial sentence was unjust and too harsh.
By resentencing the defendant to a milder punishment, the trial
court is swiftly correcting its own mistake and easing unfair human
suffering. Many would regard this as morally correct.
judge from increasing a partially served sentence.

When faced with the

appropriate case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could prohibit further
use of the discretion of a trial judge to increase a partially executed

sentence. Or, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with the authority provided
it by PA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (c), could abolish the current practice by adding
an appropriate rule to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
131. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
132. See case cited note 28 supra and accompanying text.
133. See case cited note 15 supra and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion of the conceptual weaknesses of the "control rationale" see Section IA of this Comment supra. For a discussion of the
conceptual weaknesses of the "double jeopardy rationale" see Section IB of
this Comment supra.
135. See case cited note 45 supra and accompanying text.
136. See case cited note 15 supra and accompanying text.

This positive moral reaction must be weighed against certain
substantive factors. First, if a trial judge does give an unjust and
harsh sentence, the defendant still has the remedy of appeal. Second, if a trial judge does have a viable power to reduce the sentence
within the trial term, he may be subjected to outside forces which
could force him to modify a just sentence. Not only are the possibilities of corruption a concern here, but to preserve the integrity
of the judiciary a trial judge should not be pressured by the public
to modify an unpopular decision. 13 7 Finally, an improper sentence
would most likely reflect the negligence of the trial court. Care in
sentencing ought to be encouraged. However, the power of a trial
court to reduce a sentence would seem to condone such judicial
carelessness by giving a judge an opportunity to cover up an improper sentence. With this device available, judges might be less
likely to give the initial sentencing the great care it deserves.1 8
It is therefore submitted that Pennsylvania should not allow
any alteration of a sentence once it has been partially executed.
ELLIOT A. STROKOFF

137. Commonwealth v. Allen, 217 Pa. Super. 59, 63, 266 A.2d 799,
801 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
138. Id.

